This is the second of my two posts on Matt Zwolinski’s critique of the moral equivalence thesis, looking at the second (and to me, more interesting) objection to moral equivalence. For Zwolinski, the “fundamental problem” with moral equality is that “we cannot base high-level conclusions about politics and social organization (only) on the basis of micro-level examples.”
I sympathize with the idea that the rules of individual, face-to-face interaction may be an incomplete guide to determining the rules of high-level social institutions. This is consistent with FA Hayek’s critique of the concept of “social justice.” In Hayek’s view, advocates of “social justice” err for the same reasons on the issue identified by Zwolinski – they take claims about what may or may not be the case in individual, small-scale cases and try to copy-paste those conclusions about the fairness of larger social consequences that emerge.
Hayek freely admitted that “the way in which the benefits and burdens are distributed by the market method must in many cases be regarded as unfair.” if it was the result of a deliberate allocation to certain people.” But, Hayek argues, we cannot distinguish cases of “intentional distribution to certain people” made at the level of individual agents to claims about mere distribution at the level of society as a whole. Attempting to do so, Hayek argued, falls “not into the category of error but into that which is absurd.”
But even granting that examples of small-scale ethical behavior cannot fully account for the laws of large-scale social organization, this still does not give much influence against the thesis of moral equality. The reason is because, as I see it, Zwolinski is working with too narrow a definition of the moral equality thesis to begin with.
In Zwolinski’s post, he describes the theory of moral equality as the idea that “governments have rights that are not equal to or derived from the rights of individuals. In other words, if something is wrong with individuals, it is wrong for the government to do so.” But I think this is the opposite of what the advocates of the moral parity thesis say. For example, Michael Huemer (as strong a proponent of the moral equality thesis as you’ll ever find) explained His opinion is as follows, in his book The Problem of Political Authority:
Political authority is a special moral condition, which places the state above all non-state agents. If we reject this view, then we must evaluate state coercion in the same way as we evaluate coercion by other agents. In any coercive state action, we must first ask what is the state’s reason for using coercion in this way. We must then consider whether a private person or organization can be justified in using the same type and level of coercion, with the same consequences for victims, for the same reasons.
Note that Huemer’s argument does not at all require the belief that micro-level examples of individual behavior are the only determinants of macro-level conclusions about social organization. And when Huemer speaks of “agents” he does not mean “individuals.” After all, he calls the state an “agent” even though it is clear that the state is not a person, and he is also talking about private organizations. Huemer does not want, as Zwolinski puts it, that “if something goes wrong individuals to do, then it is not right for the government to do so.” Those who support political authority argue not only that the state can do things that no one else is allowed to do, but also that the state can do things that it would not be allowed to do if it were involved in any other welfare institution that comes along.
Are we to conclude that because macro-level social laws cannot be derived entirely by reference to micro-level individual behavior, that large religious organizations such as the Church of Scientology have special rights and exemptions from behavior that no other organization has? Or big enough companies? Or families? Any other great community center you can imagine? States, after all, are one of many different organizations used to coordinate social activities – so one would need more arguments for why this special moral exemption appears. only in the case of the state but not anywhere a non-governmental social institution.
As Vincent Ostrom puts it:
We must not think of “government” or “governance” as something provided by states alone. Families, voluntary organizations, villages and other forms of human association all involve some form of self-governance. Rather than just looking at states, we need to pay more attention to building the kinds of basic structures that enable people to find ways to constructively communicate with each other and solve problems in their daily lives.
One can accept that all of these forms of human interaction described by Ostrom may operate by laws that do not directly derive from micro-level examples of individual behavior. I, for example, freely admit that the behavior of a small level of interaction of adults does not fully explain the duties and responsibilities that are part and parcel in families. But that, by itself, does not affect the moral parity thesis. To disprove the moral equality thesis one would need to provide additional reasons why one as well only one form of social organization carries an impressive exemption and moral weight as it is usually attributed to government. And the emerging nature of social behavior, itself, still leaves that gap unfilled.
Source link