I find the debate about the existence of god very interesting. Among the many arguments that exist, one argument that supports the existence of god that I find very intelligent is Alvin Plantinga’s ontological argument. I won’t get too into the weeds on the finer details of that argument here, but in a simplified and condensed way, it can be explained like this. After giving the definition of the word “god,” the argument begins on the premise that the existence of such a being is at least possible. From there, it uses modal logic to go through a series of steps to reach the conclusion that the existence of such a person is indeed true. The argument is logical, and everything follows reversibly from the minimal premise that God’s existence is possible. This means that to deny the conclusion of the argument, it becomes your responsibility to refute that first premise, and provide a positive argument that the existence of god is impossible.
One of the major claims of the modal ontological argument is to show that there is an equivalent argument that can be constructed to reach the opposite conclusion. That is, you can also start with the modest premise that god might not exist, and using the same logical steps, come to the conclusion that god’s absence is indeed true. In order to solve this problem, one would need to propose some kind of balancing distinction between these two arguments, so that we have some non-deterministic reason to prefer one over the other. Philosophers and theologians have proposed a number of symmetry breakers over the years – you can see their synthesis and evaluation this a newly released paper, if you will.
Why am I bringing all this up? Well, recently I posted about how I find libertarianism and classical liberalism to be more focused on equality than other political philosophies. I argued that Thomas Christiano’s discourse of democratic authority based on the obligation to show due respect to the judgment of fellow citizens fails because the obligation he cites (if it existed, which is far from obvious!) is consensual. As I put it there:
Even assuming that putting one’s judgment above the judgment of others is an unacceptable error, the situation is still changing. If my fellow citizens say that I should do as they have decided because if I do not, I consider my judgment to be higher than theirs and behave badly, I can say the same for trying to force me to do as they have done. they decided, they put their judgment above mine, they put me down and mistreated me. The situation is favorable.
I also argued that Yoram Hazony’s concern about free trade eroding loyalty among the nation’s citizens fails because of the same issue:
After all, what Hazony often asks for is your mind loyalty to each other – and the thing about being honest with each other is that it is mutual. The responsibility goes both ways. So why can we say that I failed to show Walter due loyalty by buying from Carl? Why would you say that Walter would be failing to show due loyalty to me, by insisting that I buy from him despite the huge financial burden it would place on me? Simply saying “mutual loyalty” does nothing to solve this
Like the modal ontological argument, both of these cases require a symmetry breaker before they can reach the conclusions sought by their proponents. And that’s what I think liberal and libertarian thought helps bring to the table by focusing on the harmonious nature of these situations. The requested symmetry is not a semantic positioning, designed to stop conversations. It is an invitation to move the discussion forward by pointing out that there is another aspect that needs attention.
In the comments section of my previous post, commenter Dylan too raised the issue of symmetry breakers with respect to external objects. Dylan points out that in many cases, people’s moral judgments about the situation serve as a determinative measure. I brought up Ronald Coase’s understanding of the consistent nature of externalities in my post – and Dylan explained how widespread beliefs about certain cases, for many people, will violate the consistent nature. As he puts it:
Take the classic example of a polluting industry, the idea that I have to pay to stop a factory from polluting (or pay to reduce my exposure) just feels wrong at a fundamental level, even if that solution wins out for practical reasons.
I think this accurately describes how most people would react to this situation. Telling someone “Well, why don’t you pay that company to put in sprinklers if you’re upset about the smoke and soot in your yard” just feels bad. Most people have a strong reaction to the lines “They shouldn’t be blowing soot in my house in the first place – why should they I you have to pay see to stop?”
I think that in most cases, moral considerations are the source of symmetry breakers. To use a simple example, my desire to keep my house from burning down interferes with Pyro Pete’s desire to burn down houses. Technically, we force each other in a complementary, equal way. But I don’t think it’s a big moral mystery to figure out what the symmetry breaker is in this situation. Arson is wrong, so my positing of Pyro Pete’s desires is right in a way that breaks the equation.
Sometimes in cases where the moral obligation is not clear (or does not apply), there are other sources of symmetry breaking. Sometimes social conventions and norms can act as symmetry breakers. Or in the court system, one standard that is sometimes used is the principle of “minimum cost avoidance.” At this level, if two parties are equally constrained (in a way that does not clearly violate some existing law or moral obligation), the responsibility to remedy the situation is assigned to whichever party faces the lowest cost of doing so. If changing shape is a big burden for me but a minor inconvenience for you, that acts as a symmetry breaker in these situations.
The liberal and classical liberal focus on harmony and balance is not born from a certain desire to argue that all laws or interventions are always inappropriate on the grounds that all situations are equal. If that were the case, libertarians would be arguing that the law prohibiting Pyro Pete from burying my house is unjustifiable – but I’ve yet to meet a libertarian who favors cremation! But libertarians and classical liberals are right to point out that the issue of reciprocity and equality exists and are important issues that deserve to be explored. Symmetry is not an insurmountable obstacle – but ignoring the problem is wrong. To the extent that liberals and liberals of old keep this issue, they are doing public speaking as a service.
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